Security Hardening

Built-in security mechanisms

MechanismDescription
Encrypted upstream key storageEach tenant has a random tenant key that encrypts upstream keys and Vertex private keys with XChaCha20-Poly1305; the tenant key is in turn encrypted with the account's own API key
Credential isolationApplications hold only XSI keys; all caller credentials and client IP headers are stripped before forwarding, and upstream keys are never returned to regular accounts
Authentication protectionAuthentication failures are counted per IP with temporary bans; invalid keys are negatively cached
Admission pipelineIP, status, quota, rate limits, and resource and model allowlists are checked layer by layer
Tenant isolationKeys, configuration, and pricing are isolated per tenant; account management only applies to the operator's own subtree
Signup abuse preventionIP and email rate limits, progressive delays, automatic bans, and a site-wide daily quota
Memory protectionCore dumps are disabled at process startup

Deployment checklist

Secrets

  • The root key and database password use randomly generated values, and docker-compose.yml has permissions 600.
  • The root key is used only for administration, never for model calls or distribution to applications.
  • Applications use dedicated sub-account keys, split by environment and purpose.
  • If a leak is suspected, rotate the key with POST /x-self; the old key is invalidated immediately.

Network

  • Ports stay bound to 127.0.0.1, so only the reverse proxy can reach the API and console ports.
  • PostgreSQL and Redis are not published to host ports (the template default).
  • HTTPS is enabled on every entry point.
  • TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS contains only your own proxy addresses, so clients cannot spoof their IP.
  • Block utility paths that need no public exposure at the proxy: /x-gkey, /x-ekey/, /x-dkey/. They require no authentication, only generate and encode/decode keys, and serve no purpose for external users.
location ~ ^/x-(gkey|ekey|dkey) { return 404; }
  • If the configuration console is not meant for the public, restrict access to it by source IP.

Mail

  • Configure your own SMTP for the mail service in docker-compose.yml.
  • Keep EMAIL_SMTP, EMAIL_AUTH, and EMAIL_PASS for the API container as empty strings, as in the template, or set them explicitly to your own values. Do not rely on the defaults in the code.
  • Set XAI_MAIL to your own operations mailbox to receive notifications such as unknown models and failovers.
  • Welcome emails and key rotation emails contain the API key in plaintext, so make sure the mail path uses TLS.

Upstream keys

  • Use fields=summary when querying keys; full mode and the sleeping/disabled lists in GET /x-conf return plaintext.
  • Set AUTO_DISABLE_KEY_STATUS=401 so keys revoked by the upstream drop out of rotation automatically.
  • Rotate upstream keys regularly, and set usage caps in the upstream consoles as a last line of defense.

Access control

  • Accounts that need quotas and rate limits enforced use Role 2 or 3 (Role 0/1 skips quota and rate limit checks).
  • Set AllowIPs on production accounts; set AllowModels and Resources on accounts distributed externally.
  • Keep USER_FILTER=true.
  • For deployments without open signup, set SIGN_ENABLE=false; with open signup, configure SIGNUP_ALLOW_DOMAINS or SIGNUP_DENY_DOMAINS.

Logs and errors

  • Keep LOG_ENABLE=false in production, and enable it only briefly while troubleshooting.
  • For services facing end users, set MASK_ERRORS=true to hide upstream error details.
  • Redact the Authorization and x-api-key request headers in proxy and application logs.

Data

  • Copy PostgreSQL and Redis backups to another machine, and rehearse restores regularly.
  • Restrict access to the backups/ directory on the host.

Reporting vulnerabilities

If you find a security issue, email [email protected]. Do not disclose details in a public issue.